Final conference in Paris Nanterre April 2018

Lidia Palumbo & Anna Motta : On the desire for drink in Plato and the Platonist tradition


In our paper we would like to discuss some pages of the Platonic corpus, also commented in the Platonist tradition, in which Plato describes thirst as an appetite for drink. Our aim is to better understand what kind of desire that for drink is, by starting with the section of the Republic (book IV)...

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Josh Wilburn : “The Two Faces of Spiritedness: Plato on Thumos and the Oikeion”


In this paper I argue for a new understanding of Plato's conception of spirited motivation and thumos. My interpretation is grounded in a close analysis of Republic 375a-376c, the crucial passage from Book 2 in which Plato first introduces his conception of ‘spiritedness’ in the dialogue through...

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Pia Campeggiani : Emotions and pleasure: the psychophysiology of poetic experience in Plato’s Ion


This paper deals with Plato’s elaboration of the topos of the inspired poet in the Ion. After briefly discussing Plato’s inquiry into the notion of technē, I will explore the nature and function of poetic inspiration in the context of the rhapsode’s performance. I claim that inspiration...

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Simon Scott : Shaming the beloved. The importance of loving well in Plato’s Symposium and the Phaedrus


A number of modern philosophers regard shame only as a negative emotion that can destroy an individual and lead to his or her removal from society or even to suicide (e.g. Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls). In the many observations on shame Plato makes in his works, we are reminded that shame can also...

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Paris-Nanterre Venue - March 2017

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Christof Rapp : Aristotle’s definition and classification of the so-called „affections of the soul“


Aristotle’s Rhetoric presents an admirably differentiated analysis of different types of emotions. The starting point for the discussion of each particular emotion is a definition that defines the various emotions in terms of pleasure and pain and with reference to the typical object of each...

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Chiara Militello : Shame and Reason. The Cognitive Requirements of Aischynê according to Plato


While the ethical and political significance of aischynê (shame) in Plato has been studied by Christina H. Tarnopolsky (Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants, 2010), the cognitive requirements of this emotion have yet to be investigated. This question seems to be very interesting though, especially...

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Mariangela Esposito : The emotions of beauty and Eros in Plato


Eros is one of the most powerful pathè described by Plato. Furthermore, its power is reinforced by the manifestation of beauty that often accompanies and precedes Eros. The two phenomena are indivisible in the same way that Aphrodite and Eros appear together when they want to exercise their power...

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Naoya Iwata : The Generation of Desire: Plato’s Philebus and Timaeus


At Philebus 34c10–35d7 Socrates argues that desire consists in the soul’s anticipation of a bodily pleasure aroused by its memory of a past one, and therefore that it does not belong to the body but to the soul. In the course of this argument he asks what would happen to a new-born baby who...

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Myrthe Bartels : Plato’s seasick steersman


In Republic Book I, Socrates distinguishes between the ruler (arkhōn) and the ruled (arkhomenoi) by means of a series of tekhnē-analogies. The ruler is qualified to rule in virtue of his expert knowledge (epistēmē and/or tekhnē)—a stock claim not only in the Republic but in the Platonic...

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Karine Tordo-Rombaut : Le dialogue des émotions dans le corpus platonicien


Le concept général d’« émotion » ne paraît pas avoir d’équivalent dans le corpus platonicien. Les sens respectifs de πάθος (ou παθήμα) et d’« émotion » ne se recoupent que partiellement. L’émotion a pourtant sa place dans ce corpus, où elle est représentée par ses...

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Edinburgh Venue - April 2017

Julia Pfefferkorn : The ‘dyo phobôn eidè’ of Laws I


In Laws 646e4, right after the puppet allegory, the Athenian introduces a distinction between ‘two nearly opposed kinds of fear’ (δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία), the first of which is described very generally as the expectation of evils, whereas the second refers,...

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Beatriz Bossi  : On envy as self deceit


Envy is a complex and puzzling emotion. In this paper I would like to explore the relation Plato seems to establish between envy and self deception in the light of Philebus 47-51. While it may be obvious why arrogance is a result of self deception, it does not seem easy to understand why Socrates...

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Freya Moebus : Emotions and appetites in the Socratic dialogues


Socrates acknowledges the existence of phenomena we conceive of as emotions, such as fear, anger, envy, and shame; he also acknowledges the existence of appetites, such as hunger, thirst, and sexual desire. However, interpreters disagree about what Socratic emotions and appetites are and which role...

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Stefano Maso : Emotions in context: “risk” as condition for emotion


I will focus on the concept of risk in Plato, as the condition for the occurrence (or the outbreak) of emotion. In particular I will examine two distinct passions: courage (ἀνδρεία) and love (φιλεῖν/ ἐραστεύειν). In both it seems that we should assume that there is an...

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Simon Scott : Shaming the beloved. The importance of loving well in Plato’s Symposium and the Phaedrus


A number of modern philosophers regard shame only as a negative emotion that can destroy an individual and lead to his or her removal from society or even to suicide (e.g. Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls). In the many observations on shame Plato makes in his works, we are reminded that shame can also...

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Carla Francalanci : Love, Speech and Charm in the Charmides


Plato’s Charmides can be seen as paradigmatic in several aspects, when one investigates how emotions are present and what is their role in the dialogues. The environment of this dialogue is clearly erotic, with the beauty of the young Charmides and the attraction of Socrates by him serving as a...

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Frisbee Sheffield : Philia in Plato’s Laws


Just as in virtue ethics we are familiar with the idea that virtue is not just a matter of reliably doing the right thing, but doing it in the right way with the right feelings and desires, so for virtuous citizenship, we do not just engage in co-operative activity, but need to be orientated towards...

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